| |
Special Topic
|
|
Statistical Science and Philosophy of Science: Where Do (Should) They Meet in 2011 and Beyond? |
|
Guest Editors: Deborah G. Mayo, Aris Spanos and Kent W. Staley
|
|
Statistical Science Meets Philosophy of Science: The Two-Way Street
|
|
At one level of analysis, statisticians and philosophers of science ask many of the same questions: What should be observed and what may justifiably be inferred from the resulting data? How well-tested or confirmed are hypotheses with data? How can statistical models and methods bridge the gaps between data and scientific claims of interest? These general questions are entwined with long standing philosophical debates, so it is no wonder that the statistics crosses over so often into philosophical territory.
The "meeting grounds" of statistical science and philosophy of science are or should be connected by a two-way street: while general philosophical questions about evidence and inference bear on statistical questions (about methods to use, and how to interpret them), statistical methods bear on philosophical problems about inference and knowledge. As interesting as this two-way street has been over many years, we seem to be in need of some entirely new traffic patterns! That is the basis for this forum. Contributions grew out of a conference (June 2010, London School of Economics, Center for the Philosophy of Natural and Social Science, CPNSS) and conversations initiated soon after.
|
|
Contributions
|
|
Oct 18 2011
Conversation |
David Cox and Deborah G. Mayo
Statistical Scientist Meets a Philosopher of Science: A Conversation
RMM Vol. 2, 2011, 103–114, Special Topic |
| |
|
|
|
| |
|
Oct 07 2011
Introduction |
Deborah G. Mayo
Statistical Science and Philosophy of Science: Where Do/Should They Meet in 2011 (and Beyond)?
RMM Vol. 2, 2011, 79–102, Special Topic |
| |
|
|
|
| |
|
|
| |
Sep 26 2011
peer reviewed |
Stephen Senn
You May Believe You Are a Bayesian But You Are Probably Wrong
RMM Vol. 2, 2011, 48–66, Special Topic |
| |
|
|
|
| |
|
|
| |
Sep 28 2011
peer reviewed |
Andrew Gelman
Induction and Deduction in Bayesian Data Analysis
RMM Vol. 2, 2011, 67–78, Special Topic |
| |
|
|
|
| |
|
|
| |
Jan 12 2012
peer reviewed |
Jan Sprenger
The Renegade Subjectivist: Jose Bernardo's Objective Bayesianism
RMM Vol. 3, 2012, 1–13, Special Topic |
| |
|
|
|
| |
|
|
| |
Oct 31 2011
peer reviewed |
Aris Spanos
Foundational Issues in Statistical Modeling: Statistical Model Specification and Validation
RMM Vol. 2, 2011, 146–178, Special Topic |
| |
|
|
|
| |
|
|
| |
Oct 26 2011
peer reviewed |
David F. Hendry
Empirical Economic Model Discovery and Theory Evaluation
RMM Vol. 2, 2011, 115–145, Special Topic |
| |
|
|
|
| |
|
|
| |
Nov 14 2011
peer reviewed |
Larry Wasserman
Low Assumptions, High Dimensions
RMM Vol. 2, 2011, 201–209, Special Topic |
| |
|
|
|
| |
|
|
| |
Sep 26 2012
Article |
Deborah G. Mayo
Statistical Science and Philosophy of Science Part 2: Shallow versus Deep Explorations
RMM Vol. 3, 2012, 71–107, Special Topic |
| |
|
|
|
| |
|
|
| |
|
|
| |
Discussion
|
|
| |
Feb 23 2012
Comment |
Deborah G. Mayo
How Can We Cultivate Senn's Ability, Comment on Stephen Senn, "You May Believe You are a Bayesian But You're Probably Wrong"
RMM Vol. 3, 2012, 14–18, Special Topic |
| |
|
|
|
| |
|
|
| |
Mar 12 2012
Comment |
Stephen Senn
Names and Games, A Reply to Deborah G. Mayo
RMM Vol. 3, 2012, 19–21, Special Topic |
| |
|
|
|
| |
|
|
| |
|
|
| |
|
|
| |
|
|
